missouri v jenkins case brief 1990

Ward, The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 28 Federal B. J. The "Hancock Amendment" requires property tax rates to be rolled back when property is assessed at a higher valuation to ensure that taxes will not be increased solely as a result of reassessments. U.S. 381 Supp., at 412-413. See Louisiana ex rel. Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to rule that KCMSD should be responsible for funding its share of the remedy. Clearly, "a reasonable attorney's fee," as used in 1988, cannot have been meant to compensate only work performed personally by members of the Bar. 433 Anything that is predominantly black is not necessarily inferior. 14 The Missouri Constitution limits local property taxes to $1.25 per $100 of assessed valuation unless a majority of the voters in the district approve a higher levy, up to $3.25 per $100; the levy may be raised above $3.25 per $100 only if two-thirds of the voters agree. We also hold, however, that the modifications of the District Court's order made by the Court of Appeals do satisfy equitable and constitutional principles governing the District Court's power. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (CA8 1986). Barnes Asst. 10 (1).docx - Alyssa Barnes Case Brief- Week (1936); Leishman v. Associated Wholesale Electric Co., Taxation by Judicial Decree - Jstor [495 See also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 215 In other words, the State argues that federal courts cannot set aside state-imposed limitations on local taxing authority because to do so is to do more than to require the local government "to exercise the power that is theirs." It determined that segregation had caused a systemwide reduction in student achievement in the city district's schools and ordered a wide range of remedial "quality education" programs for all students in the city district's schools. The District Court declined to impose a greater share of the cost on the State, but it accepted that KCMSD had "exhausted all available means of raising additional revenue." U.S. 33, 47] , we stated that the enforcement of a money judgment against the State did not violate principles of federalism because "[t]he District Court . Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. by Benna Ruth Solomon, Joyce Holmes Benjamin, and Andrew D. Hurwitz; and for Icelean Clark et al. Second, it was held that the writ of mandamus would not lie to compel the collection of taxes when there was no person against whom the writ could operate. [495 Local government bodies in Missouri, as elsewhere, must derive their power from a sovereign, and that sovereign is the State of Missouri. was explained in Pink, "[a] timely petition for rehearing . But rules of taxation that override state political structures not themselves subject to any constitutional infirmity raise serious questions of federal authority, questions compounded by the odd posture of a case in which the Court assumes the validity of a novel conception of desegregation remedies we never before have approved. 113a. [ (1973) (quoting Jefferson v. Hackney, The Court held the subsequent limitation itself unconstitutional, a violation of the Contracts Clause. U.S. 274, 280 Missouri v. Jenkins 495 U.S. 33 (1990) | Encyclopedia.com U.S., at 291 This puts the conclusion before the premise. The plan was intended to "improve the quality of education of all KCMSD students." [495 . Such a plan as a practical matter raises many of the concerns involved in interdistrict desegregation remedies. An adjustment for delay in payment is an appropriate factor in determining what constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee under. H. Bartow Farr . Cf. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed insofar as it required the District Court to modify its funding order and reversed insofar as it allowed the tax increase imposed by the District Court to stand. (1888). Ante, at 51. As long as the state is not interfering on the basis of race, the courts should step aside. [ On October 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals denied this and two. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected the State's argument that a federal court lacks judicial power to order a tax increase. . On December 31, 1988, 78 days after the issuance of the order denying rehearing and 134 days after the entry of the Court of Appeals' judgment, Jackson County presented to this Court an application for extension of time in which to file a petition for certiorari. U.S. 33, 53]. U.S. 247, 258 (1977). Footnote 18 (abbr. No one suggests the KCMSD taxpayers are parties. (1990), is missing here. of Education, On January 10, 1989, the Clerk of the Eighth Circuit issued an order amending the order of October 14, 1988. Accepting the District Court's conclusion that state-law limitations prevented KCMSD from raising sufficient funds, it held that those limitations must fall to the Constitution's command and affirmed all of the District Court's actions taken to that point. [495 88-64 Argued February 21, 1989 Decided June 19, 1989 491 U.S. 274 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT Syllabus In this major school desegregation litigation in Kansas City, Missouri, in which various desegregation remedies were granted against the State of Missouri and other Kalima JENKINS et al. [ . Rather, that term must refer to a reasonable fee for an attorney's work product, and thus must take into account the work not only of attorneys, but also the work of paralegals and the like. The Federalist, No. 855 F.2d 1295, See Meriwether v. Garrett, Whatever the Court thinks of the Court of Appeals' opinion, the District Court on remand appears to have thought it was under no compulsion to disturb its existing order establishing the $4 property tax rate through fiscal year 1991-1992 unless and until it became necessary to raise property taxes even higher. No. As explained supra, at 43, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court in the future should authorize KCMSD to submit a levy to the state tax collection authorities adequate to fund its budget and should enjoin the operation of state laws that would limit or reduce the levy below that amount. The State maintains, however, that even under these cases, the federal judicial power can go no further than to require local governments to levy taxes as authorized under state law. [ App. The cost of these remedies was to be borne equally by the State and KCMSD. (1977), the District Court found this insufficient. The Court of Appeals' discussion of the procedures to be used in the future was not dictum, for the court had before it the State's appeal from the entire funding order of the District Email Address: 100, 110-111 (1968); see also Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., The District Court here did consider alternatives to the taxing measures it imposed, but only funding alternatives. U.S. 265, 280 672 F. Supp. Oral Argument - October 30, 1989; Opinion Announcement - April 18, 1990 . U.S. 33, 51]. In calculating the hourly rates for Benson's, his associates', and the LDF attorneys' fees, the District Court took account of delay in payment by using current market rates, rather than those applicable at the time the services were rendered. Cf. The Missouri Constitution states that "[p]roperty taxes and other local taxes . This direction indicates that the District Court understood that it was now obliged to allow KCMSD to set the tax levy itself. In addition to the MLA, Chicago, and APA styles, your school, university, publication, or institution may have its own requirements for citations. Especially where those institutions are ready, willing, and - but for the operation of state law curtailing their powers - able to remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights themselves. Use this button to switch between dark and light mode. If the Eighth Circuit had regarded the State's A second set of cases, including the Von Hoffman case relied upon by the Court, invalidates on Contracts Clause grounds statutory limitations on taxation power passed subsequent to grants of tax authority in support of bond obligations. A true exercise of judicial power provides due process of another sort. But in the end we accept the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of its October 14 order and will not assume that its action in this case is not in accord with its regular practice. Missouri v. Jenkins - Case Summary and Case Brief - Legal Dictionary The court then directed KCMSD to "approve a property tax levy rate for 1989 at a later date when financial calculations for the 1989-1990 school year are clear and submit the proposed levy rate to the Court for approval at that time." That Amendment has no application to an award of attorney's fees, ancillary to a grant of prospective relief, against a State, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, and it follows that the same is true for the calculation of the amount of the fee. Pp. 855 F.2d, at 1314. . United States District Courts. Alexis I. du Pont X, 16. U.S. 951 Lastly, the order requiring the State to continue to fund the quality education programs also cannot be sustained. U.S. 33, 38]. 88-1150 Argued Oct. 30, 1989 Decided April 18, 1990 495 U.S. 33 Syllabus In an action under 42 U.S.C. U.S. 267 Id., at 76a. A reasonable attorney's fee under 1988 is one calculated on the basis of rates and practices prevailing in the relevant market and one that grants the successful civil rights plaintiff a "fully compensatory fee," comparable to what "is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client." U.S. 187, 196 The case raises two im-portant issues: constitutional federalism concerns of the sort dealt with in the Court's opinion, and broader questions about the prac- (1972) (per curiam). A remedy that uses the quality of education as a lure to attract nonminority students will place the District Court at the center of controversies over educational philosophy that by tradition are left to this Nation's communities. Respondents argue that accepting the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of its October 14 order in this case risks confusion in future cases and invites the lower courts to pick and choose between those parties whose "petitions for rehearing in banc" they view favorably and wish to give additional time for seeking review in this Court, and those whose petitions they wish to give no such aid. 402 We denied certiorari. Respondents did not cross-petition to challenge this aspect of the Court of Appeals' judgment, so the surcharge is not before us. When it was subsequently brought to the Eighth Circuit's attention that it had neglected to refer to those papers in its order as petitions for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing in banc, the court amended its order nunc pro tunc to ensure that the order reflected the reality of the action taken on October 14. JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE O'CONNOR, and JUSTICE SCALIA join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. [495 Pp. Stat. 365 Footnote 15 The District Court abused its discretion in imposing the tax increase, which contravened the principles of comity. This Court, with full justification, has given latitude to the district judges that must deal with persisting problems of desegregation. The District Court's remedial plan was proposed for the most part by the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) itself, which is in name a defendant in the suit. A subsequent order directed that the revenues generated by the property tax increase be used to retire the capital improvement bonds. Team Assignment (Teams DH): Please write a short memorandum (3-5 pages) considering whether the Supreme Court's decision in the two Missouri v. Jenkins cases are consistent or inconsistent. U.S. 1206 U.S. 744 [ 855 F.2d, at 1318-1319. Taxation by a legislature raises no due process concerns, for the citizens'"rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule." These common-law mandamus decisions do not purport to involve the Federal Constitution or remedial powers. . [ It comes as no surprise that the cost of this approach to the remedy far exceeded KCMSD's budget, or for that matter, its authority to tax. 2101(c) requires that a petition for certiorari in a civil case be filed within 90 days of the entry of the judgment below. [495 Turning to the property tax increase, the Court of Appeals rejected the State's argument that a federal court lacks the judicial power to order a tax increase. Missouri v. Jenkins | Case Brief for Law School | LexisNexis (Rehnquist, C.J.) Although that court believed that it had no alternative to imposing the tax itself, it, in. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 No. 19831, the District Court found that the Kansas City, Missouri, School District and petitioner State had operated a segregated school system within the KCMSD. The District Court certified a plaintiff class of present and future KCMSD students. Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. Mo. This suggestion was also made by the judge dissenting below and by Clark Group. 14. Rule 41(a) requires the mandate of the Court of Appeals to issue "21 days after the entry of judgment unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order," but provides that a timely petition for panel rehearing "will stay the mandate until disposition of the petition unless otherwise ordered by the court." [495 MISSOURI v. JENKINS | FindLaw Unless the State's petition was filed within 90 days of the entry of the Court of Appeals' judgment, we must dismiss the petition. 491 7 The focus of their concern is Missouri v. Jenkins,' a 1990 United States Supreme Court decision. Respondents insist that the Eighth Circuit routinely withholds the mandate during the pendency of a suggestion for rehearing in banc even without the order contemplated by Rule 41(a) and point us to United States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1299 (1987), where the Chief Judge of that court wrote separately respecting the denial of rehearing in banc to emphasize that the Eighth Circuit has done so. Thank you and the best of luck to you on your LSAT exam. denied sub nom. 281 (1977). Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 61 (1990) (Jenkins II) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). *. [495 1987). 495 U. S. 50-52. 2101(c) - which requires that a civil certiorari petition be filed within 90 days after the entry of the judgment below and that any application for an extension of time be filed within the original 90-day period - since, while the filing of a "petition for rehearing" under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40 tolls the running of the 90-day period, the filing of a "suggestion for rehearing in banc" under Rule 35 does not. Missouri v. Jenkins No. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989), should control in the instant case in the interest of consistency. (1989). officials from applying state law that would interfere with the willing levy of property taxes by KCMSD," ante, at 56, n. 20, cause the KCMSD to exercise power under state law. Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II) United States Supreme Court 495 U.S. 33 (1990) Facts The Kansas City, Missouri, School District (the district) (plaintiff) and a group of students (plaintiffs) sued Missouri (defendant) in 1977 for maintaining a segregated school system in violation of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Perhaps it is good educational policy to provide a school district with the items included in the KCMSD capital improvement plan, for example: high schools in which every classroom will have air conditioning, an alarm system, and 15 microcomputers; a 2,000-square-foot planetarium; greenhouses and vivariums; a 25-acre farm with an air-conditioned meeting room for 104 people; a Model United Nations wired for language translation; broadcast capable radio and television studios with an editing and animation lab; a temperature controlled art gallery; movie editing and screening rooms; a 3,500-square-foot dust-free diesel mechanics room; 1,875-square-foot elementary school animal rooms for use in a zoo project; swimming pools; and numerous other facilities. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 421 (WD Mo. -386 (1908). 1, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan. The District Court declined to require the State to pay for KCMSD's obligations because it believed that the Court of Appeals had ordered it to allocate the costs between the two governmental entities. There a municipality had authorized a tax levy in support of a specific bond obligation, but later limited the taxation authority in a way that impaired the bond obligation. -542 (1931). 1 The Supreme Court majority interpreted Brown v. Board of Education as restricting only de jure segregation and referred to Milliken v. Bradley and other precedents as applying only to intra-district desegregation. [2] Then, in 1990, the Supreme Court addressed whether a federal court could order a local government to raise taxes above the state statute amount to cover the cost of removing the "vestiges of discrimination." U.S., at 291 U.S. 33, 76] App. Compare Tr. The statutory limitation, therefore, could be disregarded and the city ordered to levy the necessary taxes to pay its bonds. De facto segregation does not violate the constitution, de jure segregation does. San Antonio Independent School Dist. See ante, at 55-57. 15 [495 could not meet to fall on the State rather than interfere with state law to permit KCMSD to meet them. Citation 495 US 33 (1990) Argued. (1881) (distinguishing Meriwether, supra). as Amici Curiae 25-26. 16 The District Court took no action to reverse its tax increase through fiscal year 1988-1989. 705 (1867) (mandamus to state officials to collect a tax authorized by state law City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Missouri_v._Jenkins&oldid=1063285610, United States Supreme Court cases of the Rehnquist Court, United States school desegregation case law, Short description is different from Wikidata, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License 3.0. appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri imposed an increase in the property taxes levied by the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) to ensure funding for the desegregation of KCMSD's public schools. 374 It adopted in substance a KCMSD proposal that every high school, every middle school, and half of the elementary schools in KCMSD become magnet schools by the 1991-1992 school year. Pp. judicial power. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 276 (1989) (Jenkins I). of Education v. Doyle, U.S. 816 See Langnes v. Green, (1909) (state law authorized municipal tax in support of bond obligation; subsequent legislation removing the authority is invalid under Contracts Clause, and mandamus will lie against municipal official to collect the tax); Graham v. Folsom, KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR and SCALIA, JJ., joined, post, p. 495 U. S. 58. U.S. 258, 261 United States United States District Courts. often used to encourage voluntary movement of students within the district in a pattern that aids desegregation. 1983, on which respondents' complaint is based, is authority enough to require each tortfeasor to pay its share of the cost of the remedy if it can, and apportionment of the cost is part of the equitable power of the District Court. 19 (1985). [495 Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II) | Case Brief for Law Students The Court fails to provide any explanation why this case presents the need to endorse by dictum so drastic a step. In this particular case, the State challenged two of the remedial measures ordered by the District Court: (i) State funding of salary increases for employees of the school district, and (ii) State funding of quality education programs. Footnote 16 . Rule App. to Pet. As I discuss below, I do not think this possibility is in reality a significant one. While the court below, unlike other Courts of Appeals, does not have a published practice of treating all suggestions for rehearing in banc as containing both petitions for rehearing and suggestions for rehearing in banc, this Court will not assume that the court's action in this case is not in accord with its regular practice. rehearing in banc, unlike a petition for rehearing, "shall not affect the finality of the judgment of the court of appeals or stay the issuance of the mandate.". Wolff v. New Orleans, Although this Court of Appeals may not on every occasion have observed these technicalities, it cannot be concluded that the court has engaged in a systematic practice of ignoring them. 330 The Eighth Circuit, unlike other Circuits, does not have a published practice of treating all suggestions for rehearing in banc, no matter how styled, as containing both petitions for panel rehearing and suggestions for rehearing in banc. considered, and this Court need never have addressed the question, unless there has been a finding that without the particular remedy at issue the constitutional violation will go unremedied. 2641, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 491 U.S. at 285. Sixty-seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, Mo. One group of these cases holds simply that the common-law writ of mandamus lies to compel a local official to perform a clear duty imposed by state law. 1. As a segregation remedial order, a federal court ordered Missouri (Defendant) to fund raises for teachers and staff in the Kansas City Metropolitan School District and to fund magnet programs. Section 2101(c) also permits a Justice of this Court, "for good cause shown," to grant an extension of time for the filing of a petition for certiorari in a civil case for a period not exceeding 60 days. Accepting also the District Court's conclusion that state law prevented KCMSD from raising funds sufficient to implement the desegregation remedy, the Court of Appeals held that such state-law limitations must fall to the command of the Constitution. The State appealed, challenging the scope of the desegregation remedy, the allocation of the cost between the State and KCMSD, and the tax increase. The Court of Appeals thus required that in the future, the District Court should not set the property tax rate itself but should authorize KCMSD to submit a levy to the state tax collection authorities and should enjoin the operation of state laws hindering KCMSD from adequately funding the remedy. Supp., at 45. Footnote 4 This case clearly reveals a Court majority attempting to place parameters around what was once a relatively broad view of a federal courts ability to cure the ills of past racial discrimination. (1879) (reaffirming legislative nature of the taxing power and the availability of mandamus to compel officers to levy a tax where they were required by state law to do so); City of Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). State laws, including taxation provisions legitimate and constitutional in themselves, define the power of the KCMSD. If we had accepted the State's broader, foundational question going to the magnet school concept, we could also have made an informed decision on whether that element of the District Court's remedial scheme was within the limits of the Court's equitable discretion in response to the constitutional . District courts can and must take needed steps to eliminate racial discrimination and ensure the operation of unitary school systems. Missouri Law Review We have long since determined that "unequal expenditures between children who happen to reside in different districts" do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. ] "Magnet schools," as generally understood, are public schools of voluntary enrollment designed to promote integration by drawing students away from their neighborhoods and private schools through distinctive curricula and high quality.

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